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SOME RECENT TRENDS IN STATE
LIABILITY FOR TORT
FRANCIS BREIDENBACH*
There is perhaps no legal doctrine which has received more
criticism than that of sovereign immunity. As far back as
1934 one eminent authority listed over 35 articles or writings
which for the most part are critical of the rule,1 and the
Florida Supreme Court in a 1957 case,2 suggested that the
number of adversely critical law review articles written on
the subject since 1900 was in excess of 200. Simply stated, the
general rule is that neither the United States nor any of the
several states may be sued by a private citizen without its
consent.3 This rule, the doctrine of sovereign immunity, pre-
vails generally throughout the United States and is well
established in spite of the criticism against it by courts and
legal writers alike.'
The reason for the criticism becomes obvious when consid-
eration is given to the oftentimes cruel results. This was rec-
ognized so poignantly in an old North Dakota case in which
a parent sued a school board for negligently causing the
death of her child in a playground accident, where the court
said:
"It is regrettable, indeed, that William Anderson lost
his life in the circumstances mentioned; that his mother
has sustained an irreparable loss, and that while it is a
maxim of law that for every wrong there is a remedy,
that maxim does not seem to hold true in this and similar
cases. While the plaintiff's loss is a real one and the dam-
ages suffered by her, no doubt substantial, the law af-
fords her no remedy. The law, in effect says to her: You
alone must bear this burden; that even if substantial
damages might in some small measure assuage the great
burden imposed upon you, through no fault of yours,
nevertheless, in order to protect the public, you, widowed
though you be, must bear the burden alone."'
It is familiar history that the doctrine of sovereign im-
* Graduate of the University of North Dakota School of Law (1957),
former Assistant Attorney General, presently practicing attorney-Bis-
marck, North Dakota.
1. Borchard, State aid Municipal Liability In Tort, 20 A.B.A.J. 747,
748 (1934).
2. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1957).
3. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 770 (2d Ed. 1955).
4. See Dougherty v. Vidol, 37 N.M. 256, 21 P.2d 90, 91 (1933).
5. Anderson v. Board of Education of the City of Fargo, 49 N.D. 181,
189, 190 N.W. 807, (1922).
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munity, developed in England from feudal notions and later
from a belief in the divine right of kings, was borrowed in
this country and applied to the federal and state govern-
ments.' Apparently, the principal reasons for the doctrine
are: That the "King can do no wrong" or in modern terms,
that the state, being the sovereign cannot be sued without its
consent; and, that public policy to protect the public funds
has decreed that monies devoted to governmental purposes
should not be diverted to the payment of tort judgments.'
One of the leading proponents of the doctrine has been Mr.
Justice Holmes who reasoned: "A sovereign is exempt from
suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but upon the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends."' According to the Holmes' view
there can be no "tort" by the state when there is no remedy
against the state.' This has been compared to the argument
that there can be no disease for which medical science has no
cure."
It is not the purpose of this paper either to criticize or de-
fend the rule of sovereign immunity, for in spite of all the
criticism which it has received, the fact remains that for, the
most part the doctrine is alive and breathing today, albeit
with a large variety of limitations. The mutual problem of a
plaintiff's lawyer whose client has been injured by the state
and of the state lawyer defending against such claims is: "Is
sovereign immunity a defense in this particular case?" As
might be expected, where legal authorities and the public
generally agree that a particular rule is unfair, incongruous
results are reached," and some courts have gone a long way
toward providing exceptions for the rule" and in other situa-
tions legislatures have set aside the rule. It is not the inten-
tion here to attempt a complete discussion of the case law
pertaining to the subject or the infinite variety of statutes
pertaining to the matter. It should suffice here to point out
6. James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226, 238' (1955).
7. See Thomas v. Broadlands Community Conaol. School Dist. 348 111.
567, 109 N.E.2d 636, 639 (1952).
8. Kawananakoa vs. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
9. See The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1921); see Borchard, Gov-
ernmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 32 (1926).
10. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 32
(1926).
11. V.T.C. Lines v. City of Harlon 313 S.W.2d 573, 578 (Ky. 1958).
12. See e. g. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, supra. note 2, Overrul-
Ing precedent to hold city liable for negligence of police officers within
scope of governmental duties.
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some of the current trends and developments in this subject,
to show that more and more states are becoming responsible
for their torts, and to illustrate some of the ways through
which this responsibility occurs. Four years ago Professor
Davis observed: "Of all deserving tort claims against federal,
state and local governmental units, probably far more are
paid today than are unpaid, despite the persistence of the
basic doctrine that the sovereign cannot be sued without its
consent.""3 This conclusion of Professor Davis may or may not
be true, however, it is apparent from a reading of the litera-
ture pertaining to this subject that there is, asxhas been rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, "a stead-
ily growing policy of governmental liability" and "expanding
conceptions of public morality regarding governmental re-
sponsibility.""
It is with some limited aspects of these trends with which
this paper is concerned. No attempt will be made to discuss
the Federal Tort Claims' Act" or the various state tort claims'
acts, nor any of the special state legislation bearing on the
subject of prosecuting tort claims against the state." Nor will
we consider indemnification through private legislative enact-
ment either in Congress or in the legislatures of the various
states, although that possibility is frequently and successfully
resorted to.'
THE EFFECT OF INSURANCE UPON THE RULE
By far the most significant development in the state tort
field in recent years is the use of liability insurance both as
a substitute for and a supplement to governmental liability.'
In recent years many states have enacted statutes which
authorize or require state agencies or subdivisions to procure
13. Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 751(1956).
14. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 396(1939).
15. 28 U.S.C. § § 1346, 2671-78, 2680 (1952).16. For an excellent symposium on state and federal tort claims see 29N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1321-1461 (1954); Note: State Liability Acts, 6 Baylor L. Rev.135 (1953); Note: Tort Claims Against The State of Illinois and Its Subdivis-
ions, 47 N.W. U.L. Rev. 914 (1953); Note: Claims Against the State In Min-
nesota, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 539 (1948).
17. See Gellhorn & Lauer, Congressional Settlement of Tort ClaimsAgainst the United States, 55 Col. L. Rev. 1 (1955); Davis, Tort Liability
of G~overnmental Units, supra note 13.
18. Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev.1363, 1413 (1954); For an excellent discussion of the general topic see Note:
The Effect of Insurance On The Tort Immunity of a Governmental Sub-division, 34 Neb. L. Rev. 78 (1954).
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public liability insurance." Even without a statute requiring
the purchase of liability insurance some governmental sub-
divisions have taken it upon themselves to purchase such in-
surance. In the absence of a statute, however, it has been
held that a governmental unit has no authority to insure a
risk for which it is not legally liable.' It appears to be the
majority rule that a governmental unit lacks the power by
the purchase of liability insurance to either waive sovereign
immunity," or to estopp itself from asserting its immunity
from tort liability." It is likewise true that the mere enact-
ment of a statute authorizing the procurement of insurance
does not amount to a waiver of immunity,' for sovereign im-
munity is not waived unless the waiver appears by express
provisions of the statute or necessary inference therefrom."
In a case arising out of an accident occurring after an enact-
ment authorizing purchase of insurance, one court has reason-
ed that where liability insurance is procured prior to an auth-
orizing statute such procurement does not effect a waiver of
immunity while engaged in governmental activities, but that
it was intended only to insure against negligence arising out
of proprietary functions.' Some states have statutes authoriz-
ing the purchase of insurance which are interpreted as con-
tinuing the defense of sovereign immunity but allowing suit
on the claim directly against the insurer." ' The typical form
of the statutes, and policies issued thereunder, provide that
the insurer may not set up sovereign immunity as a de-
fense." But even such a provision does not necessarily mean
19. See e. g. Cal. Acts 1955, c. 105; N.D. Laws 1955, c. 261; Ore. Laws 1955,
c. 288; Ga. Laws 1955, No. 237; N. J. Laws 1955, c. 152; N.C. Sess. Laws 1955,
c. 911.
20. Hartford Acc. & Idem. Co. v. Wainscott, 41 Ariz. 439, 19 P.2d 328
(1933).
21. Lambert v. New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A.2d 923 (1943); Holland v.
Western Airlines Inc., 154 F. Supp. 457 (D.C. Mont. 1957); Taylor v. State,
73 Nev. 151, 311 P.2d 733 (1957); Stethenson v. Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42, 59 S.E.2d
195 (1950); Mann v. County Board of Arlington County, 199 Va. 169, 98
S.E.2d 515 (1957); Boice v. Board of Education, 111 W.Va. 95, 160 S.E. 566
(1931); Price v. State Highway Commissioner, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309
(1946).
22. E. g. Utz v. Board of Education, 126 W.Va. 823, 30 S.E.2d 342 (1944);
Pohland v. Sheboygan, 251 Wis. 20, 27 N.W.2d 736 (1947).
23. Spielman v. State, 91 N.W.2d 627 (N.D. 1958).
24. Mead v. State, 303 Mich. 168, 5 N.W.2d 740 (1942); Hummer v. School
City of Hartford City, 124 Ind. App. 30, 112 N.E.2d 891 (1953); McGraft
Building Company v. Bettendorf, 248 Iowa 1386, 85 N.W.2d 616 (1957); Pigg
v. Brockman, 79 Idaho 233, 314 P.2d 609 (1957); )Rittmiller v. School Dist.,
104 F. Supp. 187 (D.C. Minn. 1952).
25. Ford v. Caldwell, 79 Idaho 499, 321 P.2d 589 (1958).
662 (1956); Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Lagaly, 144 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1944),
(Oklahoma law).
26./i Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brashears, 226 Ark. 1017, 297 S.W.2d
662 (1956); Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Lagly, 144 F.2d 344 (10th Cir. 1944).
26./2 See e. g. Spielman v. State, supra, note 23; see Taylor v. Knox
County Board of Education, infra, note 32.
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that the insurance company will be liable, for the court may
disregard the provision and hold that the sovereign is never-
theless immune."
The minority rule seems to have made its debut in Tennes-
see in 1933, in the case of Marion County v. Cantrell.' It ap-
peared there that a county school board was sued for the
negligent operation of a school bus and on appeal it was con-
tended for the first time in the lawsuit that a judgment ren-
dered against the county was invalid because of governmental
immunity. The Court rejected that argument and held that
that point was not available since it appeared that the county
had taken out a liability policy to cover operation of the bus
and that the defense to the action was being conducted by the
liability company. Furthermore, an agreement had been en-
tered into with the liability company by which the plaintiff
convenanted to waive any recovery in excess of the policy
limits in consideration of an undertaking that the defense of
governmental immunity would not be pleaded. The Court held
that since governmental immunity was not raised in the
courts below, it could not be raised on appeal, even if it could
have been raised, in view of the agreement by the company
not to raise it.
That case was closely followed by what appears to be the
leading case in Tennessee on the subject, Rogers v. Butler.'
In that case the Court reasoned that one of the reasons for
sovereign immunity was the preservation of public funds and
that where there was no danger of their depletion by reason
of the liability insurance protecting them, there was no reason
for the rule and, hence, sovereign immunity was waived to the
extent of the policy limits. The decision of the Rogers case
has subsequently been followed in a long line of Tennessee
cases.'
As has already been pointed out Kentucky is another juris-
diction, which has permitted liability insurance to avoid the
harshness of sovereign immunity. The rationale of the Ken-
tucky rule, however, as illustrated in Taylor v. Knox County
27. See Pohland v. City of Sheboygan, supra, note 22; Livingston v. Re-
gent of New Mexico Col. of A&M A, supra.
28. 166 Tenn. 358, 61 S.W.2d 477 (1933).
29. 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1936).
30. E. g. Taylor v. Cobble.. 28 Tenn. App. 167, 187 S.W.2d 648 (1945);
Williams v. Morristown, 32 Tenn. App. 274, 222 S.W.2d 607 (1949); Wilson
v. Maurey County Bd. of Education, 42 Tenn. App. 345, 302 S.W.2d 502
(1957).
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Board of Education," is somewhat different than that which
was advanced in Tennessee. While Tennessee says that sover-
eign immunity is waived to the extent of the policy limits,
Kentucky in effect says that sovereign immunity is not waiv-
ed, but that for purposes of getting at the proceeds of the
policy, the sovereign may be sued, thereby being used as a
conduit for recovery. The court in the Taylor case said that
the liability policy there in issue was for the benefit of in-
jured third parties who might sue the insurer when the
amount of liability has been determined by final judgment
against the insured. In this connection it is important to note
the distinction which has been made between immunity from
suit and immunity from liability.' Here, the Kentucky court
holds the state immune from liability, but not from suit.
The reasoning of the Tennessee cases was, however, em-
ployed in what is now considered a leading case standing for
the proposition that the presence of liability insurance to the
extent that it protects public funds removes the reason for
immunity of a sovereign to suit. That is the Illinois case of
Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consol. School Dist.' The
agreed facts of that case showed that the plaintiffs sought
to recover for the loss of sight in one eye of a minor child
who was negligently injured in a school playground accident.
The defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds of sover-
eign immunity was granted and on appeal the court was con-
fronted with the question of whether, if sovereign immunity
existed, the carrying of liability insurance would remove the
immunity either completely or to the extent of such coverage.
The plaintiff's complaint, based on negligence, had alleged the
carrying of liability insurance sufficient to pay any judgment
recovered and offered to limit collection of any judgment to
the extent of insurance proceeds.
The appellate court concluded without any difficulty that
the school district was a quasi municipal corporation, engag-
ed in a government function of educating children and was,
therefore, not liable, for injuries resulting from tort. It then
considered the effect of insurance upon that rule and relied
upon the analogy presented in an earlier Illinois case,"4 which
31. 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.2d 700, 145 A.L.R. 1333 (1942).
32. See State v. Manion, Infra, note 98; People v. Superior Court, Infra,
note 92.
3,3. 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
34. Moore v. Moyle, 405 Il. 555, 92 N.E.2d 81 (1950).
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found that the immunity of a charitable institution from tort
claims was waived by the purchase of liability insurance
covering the tort. Sovereign immunity, the court said, is com-
parable to charitable immunity, in that the immunity exists
in each case for the purpose of protecting the trust funds or
public funds. To the extent that the danger of dissipation of
such funds becomes obviated through the purchase of liability
insurance, there is no reason to retain the rule, and thus, it
reversed the lower court. In so doing, the defendant's conten-
tion that there was no statute authorizing the purchase of
liability insurance was considered by the court as an attempt
to take advantage of its own illegal act. The court expressly
declined to hold whether or not the insurance policy amounted
to a waiver but contented itself by merely holding that the
rule of immunity vanishes to the extent of the available in-
surance. While the Thomas case appears to have reached a
logical and popular result, and is now no doubt a well estab-
lished law of Illinois, it has been severely and effectively criti-
cized in Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer' as
amounting to nothing more than sheer judicial legislation.
While the criticism might be answerable, the fact is that no
new inroads have been made in this manner upon the govern-
mental immunity doctrine since the Maffei case. However,
there appear to be several jurisdictions in which the ques-
tion might be raised and in at least one of them the courts
have practically issued an invitation to submit the question
of waiver where the statute is present and insurance is plead-
ed.'
While there seems to be an absence of a trend toward hold-
ing that sovereign immunity is waived to the extent of exist-
ing insurance, there are, in summary, several important
points to be recognized.
(1) As previously indicated, there is a persuasive, if small,
minority which holds that sovereign immunity is nullified to
the extent that liability insurance is present, or that the state
has waived its sovereign immunity to the extent that it pur-
chases liability insurance, and the question remains an open
one in some jurisdictions. (2) There is a view that liability
insurance covers liability for torts committed during the
35. 80 Wyo. 33, 338 P.2d 808 (1959).
36. See Spielman v. State, supra, note 23, at p. 630.
19621
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carrying out of proprietary functions, and one case says that
the fact of the presence of liability insurance may be persua-
sive in a determination of whether the particular function is
proprietary or governmental." (3) The fact that the sover-
eign may be immune will not necessarily prevent recovery in
those cases where the act is carried out by an agent of the
state who is not shielded by the doctrine of sovereign immun-
ity who is a named insured on a policy purchased by the
state.' (4) There is also a view that whenever the policy it-
self or ordinance in compliance with which it is issued pro-
vides that the policy shall enure to the public benefit, the in-
surer may be joined as a defendant.3" In about the same vein
lies a view that where insurance is present the governmental
unit may be sued, and although it would not be liable, a judg-
ment would in effect determine liability on the policy.'
One interesting speculation is, what might be the result in
a suit against the insurer in tort or contract for raising the
defense of sovereign immunity in violation of the terms of
the policy, thereby defeating plaintiff's recovery against the
sovereign.
TORT CLAIMS UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN CONCEPTS*
[t frequently happens that a government may inflict pro-
ptrty damage upon one of its citizens. Under such circum-
stances, the citizen may have a cause of action against that
government under a constitutional or statutory provision, in
spite of the fact that the particular government holds itself
immune from its torts.4" Such actions may be termed inverse
or reverse condemnation actions. Although it appears that
legal indexes have allowed no formal heading for such actions
and there is but a paucity of literature on the subject, they
are becoming increasingly more prevalent and thus represent
a serious inroad upon the traditional concept of sovereign
immunity. The term "inverse or reverse condemnation" con-
37. See Revis v. Ashville, 207 N.C. 237, 176 S.E. 738 (1934).
38. Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky. 1952).
39. Rittmiller v. School Dist. No. 84, supra, note 24; see James v. Young,
77 N.D. 451, 43 N.W.2d 692, 20 A.L.R.2d 1086 (1950); Connell v. Clark, 38 Cal.
App. 2d 941, 200 P.2d 26 (1948).
40. Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S.W.2d
700, 145 A.L.R. 1333 (1942); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., v. Brashears, supra, note
26; Earl W. Baker Co. v. Lagaly, supra, note 26.
"This portion is reprinted from the 1960 Belli volume of TRIAL &
TORT TRENDS, published by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., Albany 1,
New York."
41. See Davis, note 13, supra, at 766; see also Note: Reverse Eminent Do-
main: A New Look and Redefinition, 47 Ky. L.J. 215 (1959).
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templates the situation in which property has been taken by
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, but without
any payment of compensation therefor having been made."
One theory upon which such an action is brought is that since
a taking, which is otherwise lawful, would be a violation of
due process of law if done without compensation, it must be
presumed that the taker intends to pay for the property con-
demned. 3 Another view is that since the constitution guaran-
tees the right to compensation for property taken or damaged
in the public use, that obligaticn in effect is an implied con-
tract on the part of the state to compensate for damage which
it may cause," and sovereign immunity is unavailable as a
defense because the state has consented to be sued in cases
arising upon contract which include implied as well as ex-
press contracts.
While many states have statutory provisions under which
an owner can compel a condemnation action," many courts
have taken the position that the constitutional provision that
just compensation must be paid for the taking or damaging
of property is a self executing provision that does not require
statutory implementation." In New Mexico however, it has
been held that although the constitutional provision for just
compensation is generally self executing, that is not true in a
suit against the state acting through its highway commission
and in the absence of a statute authorizing suit against the
state, the plaintiff could not bring such an action even though
he had suffered damages within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provisions. 1 The New Mexico court in that case ad-
mitted that plaintiff had a right to compensation, and in
withholding judicial relief recommended that he seek redress
by legislation, which the court says, "after all, is the sole
recourse of the citizen in many cases."" .
It has been said that the constitutional provision providing
42. State of California v. U.S. District Court, 213 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir.
1954).
43. Ibid.
44. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); Jacobson v. State, 68 N.D.
259, 278 N.W. 652 (1938).
45. Jacobson v. State, supra, note 44.
46. See cases collected in NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, sec. 28, 21 (2)n.
60 (3rd Ed. 1953).
47. E. g., County of Mohave v. Chamberlain, 78 Ariz. 422, 281 P.2d 128(1955); Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1943); Renninger v.
State, 70 Ida. 170, 213 P.2d 911 (1950); Tomasek v. State Highway Com-
missioner, 196 Ore. 120, 248 P.2d 703 (1952); Chick Springs Water Co. V.
State Highway Dept., 159 S.C. 481, 157 S.E. 842 (1931).
47./1 Dougherty v. Vidol, 37 N.M. 256, 21 P.2d 90 (1933).
47./2 Id. at 92.
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for just compensation amounts to a waiver of the state's im-
munity or constitutes a consent to be sued.' Under the view
that such a provision raises an implied contract, it is said that
the injured landowner has the option of waiving the tort and
suing on the contract." In considering this theory it should be
noted that over half the states have consented to suit in con-
tract.'
Under reverse condemnation theories, recoveries for pro-
perty damage may be made for a large variety of torts, in-
cluding: maintenance of a city dump so as to permit rain to
wash its contents upon plaintiff's adjoining land;" removal of
lateral support;" damages caused to a chicken farm on ac-
count of low flying military aircraft;" pollution of stream
through dumping of sewage;"' cutting off of ingress and
egress by construction of an underpass;" the closing of a
mine under the order of the War Production Board;" the tak-
ing of possession of a coal mine by the government during a
strike;" the tearing down of a condemned building so as to
leave an interior wall exposed thereby requiring tying in and
weatherproofing;' the cutting off of a lien holder by failing
to give notice in a condemnation suit;" obstruction of a public
highway by flooding;' overflow of a storm drain ditch;'
causing foul air and noxious odors to invade plaintiff's pre-
mises; destruction of a water supply by dynamiting in a
spring;" flooding of private lands caused by highway con-
struction ;" and, crop damage caused by aerial spraying.'
A major barrier to recovery for property damage under an
eminent domain theory in some jurisdictions has been that
the property was not taken for a public use. In a recent Ken-
48. Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955); Chick
Springs Water Co. v. State Highway Dept., supra, note 47.
49. Schilling v. Carl Township, 60 N.D. 480, 235 N.W. 126 (1931); Hunter
v. Mobile, 244 Ala. 318, 18 So. 2d 656 (1943).
50. Note: The Sovereign Immunity of the States, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234,
258 (1956).
51. Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196, 82 N.W.2d 274 (1957).
52. City of Atlanta v. Kenny, 83 Ga. App. 823, 64 S.E.2d 912 (1951).
53. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
54. Lewis v. City of Potosi, 317 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1958), Rev'd on other
grounds.
55. Cerniglia v. City of New Orleans, 234 La. 730, 101 So. 2d 218 (1958).
56. Idaho Mines Corp. v. U.S., 104 F. Supp. 576 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
57. United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
58. Webster Thomas Co. v. Commonwealth, 336 Mass, 130, 143 N.E.2d 216,(1957).
59. Wilson v. Beville, 47 Cal. 2d 852, 306 P.2d 789, (1957).
60. Stewart v. Southerland County, 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 217 (1953).
61. Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955).
62. Donaldson v. City of Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942).
63. Briswold v. Town School District, 117 Vt. 224, 88 A.2d 829 (1952).
64. Lage v. Pottawattamie County. 232 Iowa 944, 5 N.W.2d 161 (1942).
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tucky case the court denied recovery to a bus company for
alleged damage to the diesel engines of its buses consisting of
loss by abrasive dust settling upon them as a result of a sand
blasting operation carried on by the city while cleaning their
nearby swimming pool.' The court simply reasoned that the
property involved in the case was not of the type which was
susceptible to a public use and, therefore, was not within the
contemplation of the constitutional mandate requiring the
payment of just compensation. The Kentucky court held that
such an action more properly fell within the category of neg-
ligent acts of a city rather than inverse condemnation and
since the city was acting in its governmental capacity it was
immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
A similar result has been reached in the United States Su-
preme Court where recovery was denied for repair of a bridge
pier damaged by the government while improving navigation,
on the grounds that the act complained of was tortious and
did not amount to a taking.7
While some states have allowed recoveries in reverse con-
demnation cases regardless of whether the damage was caus-
ed by negligence ' it appears that the majority rule is that
recovery may not be had for mere negligence.' However, if the
negligence is responsible for the creation of a nuisance it
would probably be compensable.0
In California, the most recent cases have made a distinction
between negligence which occurs when a public agency is
carrying out a deliberate plan with regard to the construc-
tion of public works, and negligence resulting from damage
arising out of the operation and maintenance of public
works.' Under the California rule, it appears that if there is
65. Benson v. Dallas County Flood Control Dist., 301 S.V.2d 729 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957).
66. V.T.C. Lines Inc. v. City of Harlan, 313 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1958).
67. Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 125 (1922).
68. Kinnischtzke v. City of Glen Ullin, 79 N.D. 495, 57 N.W.2d 588 (1953);
Logan County v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 296, 194 Pac. 621. Gwinnett County v.
Allan, 56 Ga. App. 753, 194 S.E. 38 (1937); Milhous v. State Highway Dept.,
194 S.C. 33, 8 S.E.2d 852 (19.10).
69. E. g. Neff v. Imperial Irrig. Dist., 142 Cal. App. 2d 755, 299 P.2d-359(1956); Harris v. 'United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953); St. Francis
Drainage District. v. Austin, 227 Ark. 167, 296 S.W.2d 668 (1956); Rabin
v. Lakeworth Drainage Dist., 82 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1955); V.T.C. Lines Inc., v.
Harlan, supra, note 66; Texas Highway Dept. v. Weber, 147 Tex. 628, 219
S.W.2d 70 (1949); Erikson v. Anderson, 195 Va. 655, 79 S.E.2d 597 (1954);
Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 N.W.2d
144 (1958).
70. Eller v. Board of Education, 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955);
Messer v. City of Dickinson, 71 N.D. 568, 3 N.V.2d 241 (1942); Lewis v.
City of Potosi, supra, note 54.
71. Hayasi v. Alameda County Flood C&W Conserv. Dist., 167 Cal. 2d
584, 334 P.2d 1048, (1959).
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negligence occuring in the carrying out of a deliberate plan
of construction of public works it is compensable under the
inverse condemnation theory, whereas if the negligence oc-
curs in the operation and maintenance of the public works and
not according to a planned course of action it is not compen-
sable under reverse condemnation. 2 Approximately the same
test is reached in other jurisdictions where it is held that the
damage is compensable only if it is necessarily incidental to
the public work." Furthermore, even where the doctrine of in-
verse condemnation obtains it does not necessarily preclude
application of the rule of damnum absque injuria, for if the
government acted only as a private citizen might legally have
acted, and if under such circumstances a private citizen would
not be liable then neither is the government liable."
In some states courts have permitted recoveries for tempor-
ary damages, as distinguished from a permanent impairment
of the value of the real estate." However, other courts have
held that damage caused by an occasional activity not likely
to be repeated is not a taking in the constitutional sense which
would justify an award under a reverse condemnation theory."
In a case where the injury to property is permanent the mea-
sure of damages is the difference between the value of the
land before and after the taking or damaging, but where the
injury is only temporary, the rule is that damages are mea-
sured by the cost of restoring the premises to their value at
the time of the damaging." It should be observed that the
constitutions of some states, and the 5th Amendment of the
Federal Constitution prohibit a "taking" of property without
just compensation, whereas the state constitutions of most
states prohibit a "taking or damaging" without the payment
of just compensation." Damage which is only temporary in
nature might amount to "damage" under a "taking and dam-
aging" constitutional provision and thus be recoverable but
72. E. g. Bauer v. County of Ventura, 45 Cal. 2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955);
(negligent planning and construction of a drainage ditch, recovery allowed)
Hayashi v. Alameda County Flood C.&W. Conserv. Dist. supra, (recovery
denied for negligent failure to repair break in levee.)
73. State 'Road Dept. v. Darby, mupra.
74. Wilkening v. State, 54 Wash. 2d 692, 344 P.2d 204 (1959); Anderson
v. County of Santa Cruz, 174 Cal. App. 151, 344 P.2d 421 (1959).
75. Conlon v. City of Dickinson, 72 N.D. 190, 5 N.W.2d 411, 142 A.L.R.
525 (1942); Patrick v. City of Bellevue, 164 Neb. 196, 82 N.W.2d 274 (1957);
Cf. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
76. Harris v. United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953).
77. Harkoff v. Whatcom County, 40 Wash. 2d 147, 241 P.2d 932 (1952).
See NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, sec. 6.44 (3rd Ed. 1953).
78. Wisconsin P.&L. Co. v. Columbia County, supra, note 69.
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would not amount to a "taking" within the meaning of the 5th
Amendment."
While there appears to be numerous inconsistencies in the
many cases dealing with the subject of inverse condemna-
tion, there is one area within which all courts seem to agree.
That point is that personal injuries may not be compensated
for under an eminent domain theory. One of the more ingen-
ious attempts to collect on such a claim appears in the case of
Commers v. United States.' In that case it appeared that the
plaintiff had served as an army draftee during World War II
and as a result suffered injuries which reduced his earning
capacity. Subsequent to his discharge he sued the government
to recover for his reduced earning capacity alleging that his
service in the army was in violation of the 13th Amendment
prohibiting involuntary servitude, and that his body was in-
jured, and being private property such was prohibited with-
out payment of just compensation under the 5th Amendment
of the constitution. His theory was one of implied contract.
The court rejected all of his contentions in reasoning that the
human body is not private property within the meaning of the
5th Amendment to the constitution, at least since the adoption
of the 13th Amendment, because the taking contemplated by
the 5th Amendment was not limited to times of war, and to
say that the plaintiff was entitled to just compensation would
be to admit that the government might at any time take his
body subject only to the requirement that it pay such com-
pensation. The prospect of such action on the part of the
government seemed to the court to be contrary to our entire
theory of government."
An even more convincing argument was made out in the
California case of Brandenburg v. Los Angeles Flood Control
Dist" In that case parents sued for the alleged wrongful
death of their minor son who was claimed to have been in-
jured through the negligence of the flood control district. It
was conceded that the district was a public agency immune
from action for negligently caused damages under the rule of
sovereign immunity. However, it was claimed by the plaintiff
that the district in causing the child's death was engaged in
79. See County of Mohave v. Chamberlain, supira, note 47, 281 P.2d at 133-
80. 66 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mont. 1946).
81. Commers v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mont. 1946).
82. 45 Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941).
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an authorized public project and that under the constitution
property was taken subject to the requirement of just com-
pensation. Furthermore, although the plaintiff conceded the
child was not a chattel and that the parents had no property
right in such a child, it was contended that a statutory cause
of action enduring to a parent for wrongful death was such a
property right as would entitle the parents to just compensa-
tion. The Court rejected this claim of the parents reasoning
that the property right in the cause of action for wrongful
death did not arise until the death of the minor child and,
therefore, it was not the property of the parents which was
taken at the death of the child.83 It is interesting to speculate,
however, what a court might hold under facts similar to those
in this case and in a jurisdiction which permits recovery un-
der an eminent domain theory for a single negligent act if the
parents had sued for the taking of this property right in the
services of the child rather than for their property right in
the statutory cause of action arising out of his death.
While it does not appear that any courts have allowed re-
covery for personal injuries under an eminent domain theory,
there seems to be no reason why damage to or a taking of
personal property could not be recovered just as easily as
those to real property,"4 although some courts would impose
the requirement that the personal property be of the type cus-
tomarily subject to condemnation for public use.'
The important thing is that reverse or inverse condemna-
tion, both of which are misnomers,' represent an important
theory for the recovery of property damage tortiously inflict-
ed by a governmental unit. It is not a new theory, but until re-
cent times it has been seldom employed, perhaps because of
the unfamiliarity of the tort lawyer with the law of eminent
domain from which the theory stems, and perhaps from the
fact that there has been little literature on the subject and
the cases have been indexed under such nondescript headings
as "property owners' remedies". It would not be surprising to
see this theory of tort recovery become increasingly more
prevelant.
83. Brandenburg v. Los Angeles Flood Control Dist., supra, note 82.
84. See NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 1313 (3rd ed. 1953).
85. V.T.C. Lines v. City of Harlon, supra, note 67.
86. Does it make any difference whether the condemnation proceedings
are upside down, I. e. "inverse", or merely turned around, I. e. "reverse".
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GOVERNMENTAL-PROPRIETARY DISTINCTION APPLIED
TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF STATE
Although most of the substantial inroads on governmental
immunity which have been made in recent years are attri-
butable to legislative action, the courts too have moved in
that direction. 7 One of those areas in which the courts are
whittling away at the doctrine of sovereign immunity is in
their application of the rule which distinguishes governmental
and proprietary functions. The central idea in the law of
municipal tort liability is that a municipality is liable for its
torts in the exercise of proprietary but not governmental
functions.' In recent years there appears to have developed
a growing trend toward applying the same distinction to tort
claims against the state with the result that recoveries have
been made in cases in which it was previously thought that
sovereign immunity would be a bar.
California seems to be the leader in this respect. In 1947 it
was held in People v. Superior Court," that where the state of
California in the operation of a State Belt Railroad as a public
carrier for hire, but without profit, along 5 miles of San Fran-
cisco waterfront, it was engaged in a commercial or business
enterprise so as to render the state liable for negligence in
the operation of the railroad. The case arose when the plain-
tiff worker was negligently thrown from the platform on top
of a tank car while testing contents of the car and was injur-
ed. There was on the books at the time a statute providing
that any person having a claim on express contract or for
negligence against the state must present the claim to the
State Board of Control and if it was not allowed he was auth-
orized to bring suit against the state. In an earlier case the
court had held that such a statute did not create liability on
the part of the state where none existed before but that it
merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such liability as
would have existed if the statute had not been enacted.' In
other words the statute merely waived immunity from suit,
not immunity from liability. It was the latter issue which was
not before the court. The court relying on the leading case of
Green v. State," which recognized the distinction between
87. James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226, 238 (1955).
88. See Davis, supra note 13 at 773; see Maguire, State Liability for Tort,
30 Harv. L. Rev. 20 (1916).
89. 29 Cal. 2d 754, 178 P.2d 1 (1947).
90. Denning v. State, 123 Cal. 316, 55 Pac. 1000 (1899).
91. 73 Cal. 29, 11 Pac. 602, 14 Pac. 610 (1887).
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governmental and proprietary functions, overruled a previous
decision"2 and held that where the state is engaged in a busi-
ness for the benefit of commerce not for profit and where it
appeared that the primary burden would be upon industry
and commerce and that it is a type of undertaking usually
carried on by private persons and not by government it is held
not to be a governmental function, but rather to be a com-
mercial or business enterprise in the negligent operation of
which the state may be held liable. Subsequently the Calif-
ornia court has gone on to hold that the state is liable for its
negligence in the operation of a state fair (thus overruling an
earlier decision)," and for its negligence in the operation of
a housing authority." Furthermore, it has recognized the dis-
tinction in other cases, while denying liability because the
particular act involved arose out of a governmental function.'
In Muses v. Housing Authority it was said that when the state
steps down from its all supreme position as a ruler and com-
petes with industry or labor, then, so far as tort liability is
concerned it must be held to be acting in a proprietary capa-
city to be subject to the same liability for its torts as private
individuals.'
The California rule would also seem to obtain in Michigan,"
where it has been recognized that there is a distinction be-
tween sovereign immunity from suit and immunity from lia-
bility. It was held there, that sovereign immunity from lia-
bility was a defense to torts arising out of governmental func-
tions, of which the operation by the Highway Department of
a ferryboat was one. Apparently, however, the door has been
left open to contend that there is no immunity from liability
for proprietary functions, and since immunity from suit has
been waived by statute, recovery may in such cases may be
had.
In New York the courts have said in a dictum pronounce-
ment that under the common law the state was subject to lia-
92. Rauschan v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 80 Cal. App. 754, 253 Pac. 173
(1927).
93. Guidi v. State, 41 Cal. 2d 623, 262 P.2d 3 (1953) overruling Melvin
v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 53 Pac. 416 (1898).
94. Muses v. Housing Authority, 83 Cal. App. 2d 489, 189 P.2d 305 (1948).
95. Talley v. Northern San Diego County Hospital Dis., 41 Cal. 2d 33.
257 P.2d 22 (1953) operating a hospital district; Gillespie v. City of Los
Angeles, 114 Cal. 2d 513, 250 P.2d 717 (1953) maintenance of public high-
way; Bettercourt v. State, 123 Cal. 2d 60, 266 P.2d 201 (1954) operation of
a toll bridge.
96. Id. at 502, 189 P.2d at 312.
97. Manlon v. State Highway Commissioner, 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527,
Cert. Den. 317 U.S. 677 (1942).
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bility when exercising corporate or proprietary functions but
immune from liability while exercising governmental func-
tions."
In Georgia," it was held that a municipal housing author-
ity created under a state housing act was subject to suit in
tort by a tenant for injuries caused by negligence of the auth-
ority. That case revolved primarily around the "sue and be
sued" clause of the housing act, which the plaintiff claimed
was a waiver of immunity. The defendant contended that the
State Highway Department, a county, and municipalities also
have legislative authority to sue and be sued, but that they
have nevertheless been held to be immune from damage suits
resulting from injury negligently inflicted while in the per-
formance of a governmental function. The court answered the
argument by saying that in each of those cases the defend-
ant's negligence occurred while in the performance of a purely
governmental function, while in the suit against the housing
authority the defendant was negligent in the performance of
a remunerative business transaction, and it thereby recogn-
ized the difference between governmental and proprietary
functions.
New Jersey has reached approximately the same conclusion
as the California and Georgia courts.'0 There, in a recent
case, it appeared that the highway authority had filed a dec-
laration of taking of a multi-family dwelling and before it had
taken possession of the building a guest of one of the tenants
was injured in a fall from a common stairway in the building.
He sued the authority for his injuries allegedly caused by
negligence. The court held that the authority had taken pos-
session in legal contemplation and had actual control of the
premises and, therefore, was responsible for the injury. The
court recognized that the authority while engaged in the
maintenance of the state highway system would be entitled to
the same sovereign immunity as the state while it was engag-
ed in carrying out that governmental function. It reasoned,
however, that the creation of authorities such as the defend-
ant and the delegation to them of functions which necessitated
98. Brown v. Board of Trustees, 303 N.Y. 484, 488, 104 N.E.2d 866, 868, 34
A.L.PR2d 720, 723 (1952).
99. Knowles v. Housing Authority of the City of Columbus, 212 Ga. 729,
95 S.E.2d 659 (1956).
100. Taylor v. New Jersey Highway Authority, 22 N.J. 454, 126 A.2d 313,
(1956).
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a relationship comparable to those ordinarily existing be-
tween private parties and the presence of a sue or be sued
clause in the authority's charter justified a holding that al-
though the authority might continue to be immune from the
carrying out of governmental functions, but that here it was
engaged in a proprietary function for which it would be liable.
Minnesota has said in the case of State v. Bently, that the
question of suing the state without its permission does not
arise in connection with a situation wherein the state acquires
title to land outside of its territorial limits. In such cases it is
acting in a proprietary capacity and cannot claim sovereign
power or immunity from suit."1 That case, while it might
more properly be referred to as a reverse condemnation case
was predicated not only upon the Minnesota constitutional
provision requiring the payment of just compensation for the
taking or damaging of property but also upon the due process
and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
There is some authority that the governmental or proprie-
tary distinction is inapplicable in determining state tort lia-
bility for the state always acts in sovereign governmental
capacity and, therefore, is always immune from tort liability
in the absence of a waiver of such immunity."' The majority
of jurisdictions however, have at least recognized the distinc-
tion between governmental and proprietary functions and
since they have exempted the sovereign on the grounds that
it was acting in a governmental capacity they seemingly
would be open to the argument that the state would not be
immune for its torts while engaged in a proprietary func-
tion.10'"
The government-proprietary distinction has been criticized
in its application to municipal tort liability' as being unsatis-
factory and confusing. In the hairsplitting over classifying
various functions, ridiculous conclusions have been reached.'
The fact remains, however, that where the distinction is
101. 216 Minn. 146, 12 N.W.2d 347 (1944).
102. See Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450 (1912).
103. Phoenix v. Lane, 76 Ariz. 240, 263 P.2d 302 (1953); Deleware Liquor
Store Inc. v. Wilmington, 46 Del. 461, 75 A.2d 272 (1950); Nordby v. De-
partment of Public Works, 60 Ida. 475, 102 P.2d 789 (1930); State v. F. W.
Fitch Co., 236 Iowa 208, 17 N.W.2d 380 (1945); Chargois v. Grimmett &
James, 36 S.2d 390 (La. App. 1948); Richardson v. Hannibal, 330 Mo. 398,
50 S.W.2d 648 (1932); Blackman v. Cincinnati, 66 0. App. 495, 35 N.E.2d 164,
Aff'd. 140 Oh. St. 25, 42 N.E.2d 158 (1940); Commonwealth v. Lundberg, 50Pa. D&C 221 (1943); Christ v. Sims, 134 W.Va. 173, 58 S.E.2d 657 (1950).
104. Davis, Governmental Tort Liability, 40 Minn, L. Rev. 751, 773 (1956).
105. Id. at 774.
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drawn in cases involving municipal liability it often has the
effect of limiting liability, while when it is applied to actions
against the state the almost inevitable result is to expand
state liability.! It is reasonable to believe that as state gov-
ernments continue to expand into fields which were formerly
matters of private business only, courts will increasingly
apply the distinction to hold the state liable for its torts in the
same manner in which a private entrepreneur would be liable.
THE LAW-A PARADOX
"Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself
is nothing else but reason... The law which is the prefection
of reason."
SIR EDWARD COKE
"The life of the law has not been logic it has been exper-
ience."
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.-Common Law
106. See James, Inron d on Old Tort Coneepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226, 239(1955).
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